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ABSTRACT 
 
On How the Debate about What Is Law Should Proceed in the  
Face of the Methodology Conflict in Jurisprudence. (May 2008) 
Gregory Michael Bergeron, B.A., University of New Hampshire 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Colleen Murphy 
 
 This thesis focuses on the contemporary literature in Anglo-American analytic 
jurisprudence that takes answering the question “what is law?” as the primary goal. 
Agreement about what is law—that is, agreement about which theory of law is accurate and 
adequate—is necessary to achieve the primary goal. Theorists have come to acknowledge 
that no such agreement exists due to their disagreements over two subjects: (S1) what is law 
and (S2) what methodology theorists should follow to produce an accurate and adequate 
theory of law. I refer to theorists’ disagreement about S2 as the methodology conflict. 
Today, theorists advance towards the primary goal in two different directions: directly or 
indirectly. The direct course labors to accomplish agreement about which theory of law is 
accurate and adequate. The indirect course toils to accomplish agreement about which 
methodology a theory of law should satisfy to be accurate and adequate, before advancing to 
the direct course. If one course is the correct or best way to achieve the primary goal, it is 
imprudent for theorists to continue to work towards the same goal in separate directions. 
How, then, should theorists proceed? Answering this question, loosely put, is the main 
objective of this thesis. 
 iv
I argue that theorists must resolve the methodology conflict first to be able to 
achieve the primary goal of jurisprudence (i.e., to reach a common answer to the question 
“what is law?”). I reveal that the methodology conflict poses a serious problem for theorists 
working to reach an agreement about S1: namely, theorists cannot agree about which legal 
theory is accurate and adequate unless they agree about which methodology a legal theory 
should satisfy to be accurate and adequate. Next, I settle the methodology conflict. I show 
that a particular synthesis of the current two approaches to resolve theorists’ disagreement 
about S2 —imperialism and relativism—provides a way out of the methodology conflict. I 
explain that the solution to the methodology conflict is a reasonable four-step examination 
process that enables theorists to engage in meaningful debate about S1 and S2 and work 
more successfully towards achieving the primary goal. 
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I.    INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM 
This thesis focuses on the contemporary literature in Anglo-American analytic 
jurisprudence that takes answering the question “what is law?” as the primary goal. The 
basic subject of jurisprudence is the law as a complex set of social phenomena that pertain 
to governance of human conduct in a community. The basic task of jurisprudence is to 
provide an enlightening account of the law that is accurate and adequate.1  Traditionally, 
offering an account of the law involves generating a set of propositions about the law, which 
explains numerous issues concerning legal and related phenomena (e.g., law’s defining 
features, law’s authority, the connection between law and morality, and the adjudication of 
law by legal officials) in a manner that furthers our understanding of what the law is. 
Theorists usually call such an account a theory of law.2 To achieve the primary goal, 
agreement about which legal theory is an accurate and adequate account of the law is 
necessary. To be sure, such agreement is tantamount to agreement about what the law is, 
that is, a common answer to the question “what is law?”. Currently, no such agreement 
exists among theorists.   
                                                 
This thesis follows the style of The Chicago Manual of Style, 15th Edition. 
 
 1 I deliberately state the task (and the subject) of jurisprudence in basic terms here to subsume 
theorists’ methodological differences between their alternative accounts of the law. In addition, I 
want to acknowledge that theorists disagree as to whether the account of the law—which is the goal 
of this basic enterprise—(a) must be one complete account that furthers our understanding of what 
the law is in a particular manner or (b) can and should be multiple partial accounts that further our 
understanding of what the law is in diverse ways. In this thesis, I discuss these differences and 
disagreements at length in Section II and Section III. Hereafter, I use the terms “jurisprudence,” 
“philosophy of law,” “legal philosophy,” and “legal theory” interchangeably to refer to this basic 
enterprise. However, to be clear, this basic enterprise is one particular area of jurisprudence. 
Jurisprudence has other areas that investigate the law. For example, the investigations into particular 
types of law: such as, criminal law, civil law, commercial law, and tort law.   
 2 Hereafter, I use the terms “a theory of law” (or “theories of law”), “a legal theory” (or “legal 
theories”), and “a theory” (or “theories”) synonymously to refer to such an account. 
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Achieving agreement about which legal theory furthers our understanding of what 
the law is accurately and adequately is a difficult enterprise given the current state of affairs 
in jurisprudence. In Concept of Law, perhaps the cornerstone of contemporary legal 
philosophy, H.L.A. Hart writes: “Few questions concerning human society have been asked 
with such persistence and answered by serious thinkers in so many diverse, strange, and 
even paradoxical ways as the question ‘What is law?’.”3 Hart’s summary of the situation in 
jurisprudence was true of the literature before Concept of Law, which was published in 
1961. Today, nearly fifty years later, it is true of the literature after Concept of Law. Hart,4 
Joseph Raz,5 John Finnis,6 Ronald Dworkin,7 and other theorists all appear to offer legal 
theories that answer the question “what is law?” in seemingly diverse, strange, and even 
paradoxical ways.   
For example, Hart, Raz, Finnis, Dworkin, and other theorists explain the connection 
between law and morality differently. Hart and Raz claim that the connection between law 
and morality is contingent (i.e., the law is neither necessarily immoral nor moral). 
                                                 
 3 Hart, Concept of Law, 1. As evidence of this jurisprudential state of affairs, Hart quotes 
central theses of his recent predecessors’ legal theories: “‘What officials do about disputes is… the 
law itself’ (Llewellyn, Bramble Bush, 9); ‘The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact… are 
what I mean by the law’ (Holmes, Collected Legal Papers, 173); Statues are ‘sources of Law… not 
parts of the Law itself’ (Gray, Nature and Sources of Law, Section 276); ‘Constitutional law is 
positive morality merely’ (Austin, Province of Jurisprudence Determined, 259); ‘One shall not steal; 
if somebody steals he shall be punished.  …  If at all existent, the first norm is contained in the 
second norm which is the only genuine norm…. Law is the primary norm which stipulates the 
sanction’ (Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State, 61).” (Hart, Concept of Law, 1-2.) 
 4 Hart, Concept of Law. 
 5 Raz, Practical Reason and Norms; Raz, Authority of Law; and Raz, Ethics in the Public 
Domain. 
 6 Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights. 
 7 Dworkin, Law’s Empire. 
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Conversely, Finnis, Dworkin, and Robert Wolff8 claim that the connection between law and 
morality is not contingent (i.e., the law is either necessarily immoral or moral). Moreover, 
although Finnis, Dworkin, and Wolff agree that the connection between law and morality is 
not contingent, they disagree about whether law is necessarily immoral or moral. Wolff 
claims the law is necessarily immoral, whereas Finnis and Dworkin claim that the law is 
necessarily moral. Thus, Hart, Raz, Finnis, Dworkin, and Wolff each offer apparently rival 
and incompatible propositions about the law concerning its connection with morality.   
However, theorists’ disagreement about the primary subject—(S1) what the law is—
only partly explains why their legal theories are seemingly diverse, strange, and even 
paradoxical answers to the question “what is law?”. In an article entitled “The Problem 
about the Nature of Law,” Raz writes: “The inability of philosophers to agree on a common 
answer [to the question ‘what is law?’] is partly due to differences in their perception of the 
nature of the problems involved in the question. Such differences reflect themselves in 
differing unstated assumptions and unconscious starting-points chosen in answering the 
philosophical questions concerned.”9  Today, Hart, Raz, Finnis, Dworkin, and most other 
theorists acknowledge that theorists offer different legal theories because they disagree 
about a second subject: (S2) what methodology should theorists follow to generate a legal 
theory that provides an accurate and adequate account of the law.10     
                                                 
 8 Wolff, In Defense of Anarchy. 
 9 Raz, Ethics in the Public Domain, 195 (brackets added). 
 10 See Bix, Jurisprudence; Coleman, Practice of Principle, Part III; Coleman, “Methodology”; 
Dickson, “Methodology in Jurisprudence”; Giudice, “Understanding Diversity”; Hart, Concept of 
Law, Postscript; Leiter, “Beyond the Hart/Dworkin Debate”; Perry, “Interpretation and Methodology 
in Legal Theory”; Perry, “Hart’s Methodological Positivism”; Postema, “Jurisprudence as Practical 
Philosophy”; Raz, “Two Views of the Nature of the Theory of Law”; and Simmonds, “Bringing the 
Outside In.” 
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Theorists’ disagreement about S2, which I also call the methodology conflict, is the 
result of two factors regarding methodology in jurisprudence. The first factor (F1) is that 
theorists endorse different methodologies to follow. The second factor (F2) is that theorists 
respond to the different methodologies that they endorse with opposing approaches, which I 
call imperialism and relativism. F1 and F2 explain the complex character of the 
methodology conflict: namely, while every theorist believes his legal theory should satisfy 
the methodology he endorses, not every theorist believes all legal theories should satisfy the 
methodology he endorses. An uncertainty about which methodology a legal theory should 
satisfy to provide an accurate and adequate account of the law exists among theorists in the 
face of the methodology conflict, which could remain unresolved for some time without a 
serious collective effort from theorists.   
Unfortunately, in recent jurisprudential literature, theorists appear to differ as to how 
they should proceed to achieve the primary goal in the face of the methodology conflict. 
Some theorists proceed towards the primary goal directly: viz., they work to reach 
agreement about which legal theory is accurate and adequate, without resolving theorists’ 
disagreement about S2. Other theorists proceed towards the primary goal indirectly: viz., 
they work to reach agreement about which methodology a legal theory should satisfy to be 
accurate and adequate, before resolving theorists’ disagreement about S1. Advancing in 
separate directions towards the same goal seems imprudent for theorists to continue if one is 
the correct or best way to achieve the primary goal. How, then, should theorists proceed? 
Answering this question, loosely put, is the main objective of this thesis.   
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I will argue that theorists should resolve their disagreement about S2 before their 
disagreement about S1 because theorists are able to move successfully towards achieving 
agreement about S1 only if they agree about S2 in advance. I divide the argument for this 
claim into four sections. To start, I clarify the first factor and the second factor of the 
methodology conflict in Section II and Section III, respectively. In Section IV, I explain 
why theorists should resolve their disagreement about S2 first. I show that the methodology 
conflict creates a serious problem for theorists working to reach an agreement about S1: 
namely, theorists cannot agree about which legal theory is accurate and adequate unless they 
agree about which methodology a legal theory should satisfy to be accurate and adequate. In 
Section V, I explain how theorists should resolve their disagreement about S2. I offer a 
synthesis of imperialism and relativism—one that combines their strengths and eliminates 
their weaknesses—as a solution to the methodology conflict. 
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II.    THE FIRST FACTOR OF THE METHODOLOGY CONFLICT 
In this section, I explain only theorists’ commitments to follow different 
methodologies. Theorists’ endorsement of different methodologies is the first factor of their 
disagreement about S2 because their response to the different methodologies with rival 
approaches, which I explain in Section III, fully develops the complex character of the 
methodology conflict. F2, that is, presupposes F1. In Section II.A, I give a general 
description of two important topics in F1: (1) what a methodology is and (2) what endorsing 
and following a methodology involves. Then, in Section II.B, I show that theorists indeed 
endorse different methodologies to follow with numerous examples of their methodological 
disagreements.   
A.    A Methodology 
Hart, Raz, Finnis, Dworkin, and other theorists each accepts a conception of what 
can and should be jurisprudence’s fundamental subject, project, and approach to produce an 
account of the law that furthers our understanding of what the law is. Most theorists have 
come to call such a conception a methodology. A theorist’s methodology includes the 
theorist’s guidelines or commitments concerning various issues surrounding the 
investigation into the law: e.g., the parameters of the analysis, the type of perspective that 
informs the analysis, and the method of the analysis. (In Section II.B, I will clarify and 
exemplify the kinds of methodological guidelines that concern the various issues mentioned 
above.) A theorist’s methodological guidelines frame jurisprudence’s basic subject and 
enterprise (which I described at the start of Section I) into a narrowly conceived subject, 
project, and approach, which the theorist believes should be followed to generate a set of 
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propositions about the law that provides an enlightening account. To put in formal terms, a 
theorist’s methodology is the set of guidelines that the theorist believes should be followed 
successfully when generating a set of propositions about the law in order to produce an 
accurate and adequate account of the law. Accordingly, when generating a set of 
propositions about the law, a theorist attempts to follow only the set of methodological 
guidelines that the theorist accepts. 
For example, consider a guideline from Raz’s methodology. The task of Raz’s legal 
theory, narrowly construed, is to provide an explanation of the nature of law.11  While Raz’s 
expression “the nature of law” roughly follows the ordinary definition of the word 
“nature”—viz., “the basic or inherent features of something, esp. when seen as characteristic 
of it”12—Raz intends a specific sort of philosophical meaning for “the nature of law.” “A 
theory consists of necessary truths,” writes Raz, “for only necessary truths about the law 
reveal the nature of the law.”13  For Raz, “the nature of law” refers only to a set of 
necessarily true properties of the law, which combine to explain the law’s fundamental 
character, or what is necessary for the law to exist (or be what the law is) in a community. 
According to Raz, a property of the law—say X—is a necessarily true property of the law if 
and only if X is “universal”14 and “essential”15 to the law. X being universal and essential to 
                                                 
 11 Raz, “Can There Be a Theory of Law,” 324. 
 12 Oxford American College Dictionary (OACD), s.v. “nature.” 
 13 Raz, “Can There Be a Theory of Law,” 328. 
 14 A property of law—say X—is universal if X is applicable to all cases of law wherever and 
whenever law is found to exist in a community. Raz’s use of “universal” roughly follows the 
ordinary meaning of “universal,” i.e. “applicable to all cases.” (OACD, s.v. “universal.”) However, 
Raz appears to amend the expression “wherever and whenever” to that definition as a universal 
qualifier for location and time. The universal qualifier “wherever and whenever” eliminates any 
properties of law that are inapplicable to all cases of law at all locations (l1, …, ln) or all times (t1, …, 
tn). For example, if X is present at l1 from t1 to tn, and if X is not present at l2 from t1 to tn, then X is 
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the law is a necessary and sufficient condition for X to be a necessarily true property of the 
law: that is, X is a necessarily true property of the law if X is universal and essential to the 
law, but X is not a necessarily true property of the law if X is not universal or essential to 
the law.   
Raz, then, accepts the following methodological guideline: a set of propositions 
about the nature of law should identify only necessarily true properties of the law. Raz 
believes that only propositions about universal and essential properties of the law—rather 
than particular and accidental properties of the law—are necessary to explain the nature of 
law accurately and adequately. Raz believes that only necessarily true properties of the law 
reveal the nature of law.16  Thus, for Raz, theorists should satisfy this methodological 
guideline to generate a set of propositions about the law that produces an accurate and 
adequate account of the nature of law. For instance, one of Raz’s propositions about the 
                                                                                                                                                
not necessarily true of law. Alternatively, if X is present at l1 from t1 to t2, and if X is present at l2 
from t3 to t4, then X is not necessarily true of law. However, a property of law could be applicable to 
all cases of law at all locations (l1, …, ln) and all times (t1, …, tn), for Raz, and still not be a 
necessarily true property of law. A universal property of law—say X—is not itself sufficient to be a 
necessary truth about law, since X is not an essential property of law. 
 15 A property of law—say X—is essential if law would not exist (or not be what law is) in a 
community without X. The ordinary meaning of “essential” is “absolutely necessary; extremely 
important.” (OACD, s.v. “essential.”) Thus, an essential property of law—say X—can be taken to be 
extremely important property of law, even though X is not absolutely necessary for the identity of 
law, that is, even though the law will not cease being in existence or being what law is without X. 
Instead, law will undergo a radical change. (Raz, “Can There Be a Theory of Law,” 329.) Raz 
believes this difference between an “absolutely necessary” property and an “extremely important” 
property is significant in philosophical investigation. For this reason, Raz uses “essential” in the 
philosophical sense of the word “essence,” as an adjective to describe “a property or group of 
properties of something without which it would not exist or be what it is” (OACD, s.v. “essence.”) 
Thus, if a property of law—say X—is not essential, the property is not necessary for law to exist or 
to be what law is, then X is significant, non-essential, or accidental, which can change over time, 
while law remains to exist in the same fundamental character. An essential property of law is not 
itself sufficient to be a necessary truth about law, since an essential property does not necessarily 
presuppose a particular or a universal application to cases of the law. 
 16 Raz, “Can There Be a Theory of Law,” 328. 
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nature of law is that the law claims to possess (but does not necessarily possess) legitimate 
authority.17  When generating this proposition about the law, Raz attempts to establish that 
the law’s claim to possess legitimate authority is a universal and essential property of the 
law, namely a property that is necessary for the law to exist (or be what the law is) in a 
community. Raz attempts to satisfy at least this one methodological guideline—that is, his 
commitment to identify only necessarily true properties of the law—when generating all his 
propositions about the nature of law. 
Moreover, a theorist’s belief that a theorist should follow a methodological guideline 
entails a belief that a theorist can follow the methodological guideline. A theorist believes 
that a methodological guideline can be followed in the sense that it is theoretically possible 
for the theorist to generate a set of propositions about the law that follows the 
methodological guideline successfully. That a theorist can follow a methodological 
guideline is a precondition for the claim that a theorist should follow the methodological 
guideline to be a meaningful requirement. For example, Raz believes that generating a set of 
propositions that identifies only necessarily true properties of the law is theoretically 
possible. Raz’s methodological guideline requires that the law—as a complex set of social 
phenomena that pertain to governance of human conduct in a community—could possess 
some universal and essential properties wherever and whenever the law is found in our 
world. However, Raz’s methodological guideline does not require that the law does possess 
some universal and essential properties because the law could possess only particular and 
accidental characteristics wherever and whenever the law is found in our world. Thus, for 
                                                 
 17 See Raz, Ethics in the Public Domain, 210-237. 
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Raz, a theorist can establish that the law possesses either some or no necessarily true 
properties in an analysis of the law.18  Thus, whether a theorist (1) can and (2) should follow 
a methodological guideline are each a potential point for disagreement between theorists. 
However, to be clear, theorists’ normative methodological disagreements are the primary 
interest of this thesis.    
B.    Different Methodologies 
While theorists in jurisprudence agree about what a methodology is in a general and 
definitional sense, they disagree about what methodology theorists should follow. Hart, Raz, 
Finnis, Dworkin, and other theorists believe different sets of methodological guidelines 
should be followed. In other words, those theorists attempt to follow successfully different 
methodologies when generating a set of propositions about the law. I provide below 
examples of theorists’ disagreements concerning four kinds of methodological guidelines, 
which are characteristic of the methodologies accepted by Hart, Raz, Finnis, and Dworkin, 
as evidence of theorists’ disagreements about S2. I call those four types of methodological 
guidelines analysis-methods, starting-points, participant-perspectives, and checking-points. 
I illustrate that Hart, Raz, Finnis, and Dworkin believe theorists should follow different 
methodological guidelines in each of those four categories. 
 
                                                 
 18 Thus, for Raz, a theorist attempts to follow this methodological guideline whether the theorist 
generates a set of propositions about the nature of law that establishes that the law possesses some or 
no necessarily true properties. To be sure, for Raz, if a theorist establishes that the law possesses no 
necessarily true properties, then an accurate and adequate account of the nature of law shows that the 
law possesses no fundamental character: viz., that no properties are necessary for the law to exist (or 
be what the law is) in a community. 
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To be sure, I am not suggesting that theorists disagree about all methodological 
guidelines. Theorists’ diverse methodologies can and do share some similar methodological 
guidelines with each other. Presumably, for example, most theorists would agree to follow a 
rule of non-contradiction as a methodological guideline when generating a set of 
propositions about the law—viz., that the propositions about the law in a set should not 
contradict each other—in order to produce an accurate and adequate account of what the 
law is. 
Analysis-Methods 
One example is theorists’ methodological disagreements about what analysis-
method(s) theorists should follow to generate a set of propositions about the law that 
produces an accurate and adequate account of what the law is. An analysis-method is a 
particular form of procedure for approaching or accomplishing an investigation of the law, 
which is the object or subject of the analysis. To put more simply, an analysis-method is a 
way in which to explain or understand what the law is.   
For instance:  Hart believes a “general and descriptive” analysis-method should be 
followed when generating a set of propositions about the law.19  Hart’s analysis-method is 
general in the sense that it seeks to provide an explanatory account of the “same general 
form and structure” that the law takes in different cultures and in different times.20 Hart’s 
object of analysis is “a complex social and political institution with a rule-governed (and in 
that sense ‘normative’) aspect” that the concept of law denotes.21  Hart’s investigation into 
                                                 
 19 Hart, Concept of Law, 239. 
 20 Hart, Concept of Law, 239-240. 
 21 Hart, Concept of Law, 239. 
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law does not concern what is the particular or accidental content or features of (i) laws, (ii) 
sub-systems of laws (e.g., common law, criminal law, commercial law, etc.), or (iii) legal 
systems (e.g., French Law, United Kingdom Law, United States Law, etc.). Hart’s analysis-
method is descriptive in the sense that “it does not seek to justify or commend on moral or 
other grounds the forms and structures which appear in my general account of law.”22  In 
other words, Hart believes that his descriptive analysis-method is morally neutral and non-
justificatory in explaining what the law is.23   
In addition, like Hart, Raz accepts an analysis-method that is general and descriptive. 
Raz, though, describes the general aspect of Hart’s analysis-method differently. Raz’s 
subject of investigation is the nature of the law as the character of certain systemic rules—as 
a unified system of rules and as individual rules24—that pertain to governance of human 
conduct in a municipality. Raz writes, “At its most fundamental, legal philosophy is an 
inquiry into the nature of law.”25 Raz’s analysis-method seeks to explain necessarily true 
properties of the law because, according to Raz, “only necessary truths about the law reveal 
the nature of the law.”26 (In Section II.A, I unpacked what a necessarily true feature of the 
law is for Raz.) That is not to suggest that the analysis-methods that Hart and Raz accept 
seek to explain different features about the law. Instead, I believe that Raz uses different 
                                                 
 22 Hart, Concept of Law, 240. 
 23 Hart, Concept of Law, 240. 
 24 To be clear, for Raz, the subject of the law is twofold. The first aspect of law can refer to the 
character of these certain systemic rules as a unified system of rules. People can refer to a unified 
system of rules with expressions such as “the law,” “a legal system,” and “a system of laws,” but not 
only those expressions. The second aspect of law can refer to the character of these certain systemic 
rules as individual rules. People can refer to an individual rule or rules with expressions such as “a 
law” or “laws,” but not only those expressions. 
 25 Raz, “Two Views of the Nature of the Theory of Law,” 251. 
 26 Raz, “Can There Be a Theory of Law,” 328. 
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language to describe the same features that Hart’s general analysis-method seeks to 
explain.27  
Dworkin, by contrast, believes an interpretive analysis-method, which he calls 
“constructive interpretation,” should be followed when generating a set of propositions 
about the law. Dworkin writes, “Roughly, constructive interpretation is a matter of imposing 
purpose on an object or practice in order to make of it the best possible example of the form 
or genre to which it is taken to belong.”28 For Dworkin, to show the law “in its best light” is 
                                                 
 27 Moreover, Raz clarifies the object of analysis more explicitly than Hart. For Raz, explaining 
“the nature of law” is not the same as explaining the word “law” and its meaning or “the concept of 
law.” Raz writes, “Concepts are how we conceive aspects of the world, and lie between words and 
their meanings, in which they are expressed, on the one side, and the nature of things to which they 
apply, on the other.” (Raz, “Can There Be a Theory of Law,” 325.) For Raz, then, the concept of law 
and the word “word” and its meaning are not identical to each other or to the nature of the object that 
the concept denotes and the word expresses. Firstly, according to Raz, the word “law” is not 
ambiguous. Whether people use the word “law” in a legal context, or a religious context, or a 
mathematical context, or any other context, Raz believes that people use this word “to refer to rules 
of some permanence and generality, giving rise to one kind of necessity or another.” (Raz, “Can 
There Be a Theory of Law,” 325.) However, Raz’s legal theory is not explaining this meaning of the 
word “law.” Raz acknowledges that people “express the concept, use [the concept], and refer to [the 
concept] by using words.” (Raz, “Can There Be a Theory of Law,” 325.) Nevertheless, Raz believes 
that people need not use the word “law” to refer to the concept of law. People still express, use, and 
refer to the concept of law, for example, when they talk about the system of courts, legislature, and 
the rules that each endorses in a state. Raz believes that the context of a discussion about the law is 
enough to determine whether people are talking about the law as a unique institutionalized 
normative system or as scientific, mathematical, or other rules of necessity. For Raz, then, “[t]he 
availability of context to determine reference establishes that there is no need for concepts to be 
identified by the use of specific words or phrase.” (Raz, “Can There Be a Theory of Law,” 325.) 
Secondly, according to Raz, law is a concept—our concept of law, to be sure—that people use to 
denote a particular object in our society. Raz writes, “Talk of the concept of law really means our 
concept of law.” (Raz, “Can There Be a Theory of Law,” 331.) “While the concept of law is 
parochial, that is, not all societies have it,” Raz writes, “our inquiry is universal in that it explores the 
nature of law, wherever it is to be found.” (Raz, “Can There Be a Theory of Law,” 332.) For Raz, 
then, the law is a local or a culture specific concept, but the nature of law refers to a set of 
necessarily true properties that could be found in any society, even in a society that uses a different 
concept or no concept at all to designate the object that our society considers law. Consequently, for 
those reasons, Raz believes that explaining “the nature of law” is not the same as explaining the 
word “law” (and its meaning) or “the concept of law.”   
 28 Dworkin, Law’s Empire, 52. 
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to identify the principle that achieve an equilibrium between (1) providing an interpretation 
that is the best “fit” with the legal materials and practice of a community and (2) providing 
an interpretation that is the best moral justification of those legal materials and practices of 
the community.29 Dworkin’s constructive interpretation is partly evaluative and justificatory 
as a result of the second dimension involving moral and political argument. In addition, 
Dworkin writes, “Interpretive theories are by their nature addressed to a particular legal 
culture, generally the culture to which their authors belong.”30  Dworkin’s constructive 
interpretation of law is particular rather than general. 
In contrast to Hart, Raz, and Dworkin, Finnis believes a complex analysis-method, 
which is partly descriptive and morally evaluative, should be followed when generating a 
set of propositions about the law. Finnis’s analysis-method does not seek to explain the 
various phenomena that the “ordinary concept” of law denotes. Instead, Finnis analysis-
method aims to develop a concept—namely, the central case of law—that explains the 
various phenomena, which “ordinary” talk about law refers to (in an unfocused way), and 
explains these various phenomena by evaluating whether they satisfy (completely or 
partially) the standing moral requirements of practical reasonableness relevant to this broad 
area of human concern and interaction.31 However, Finnis believes “the undertaking cannot 
                                                 
 29 Dworkin, Law’s Empire, 90, 411. 
 30 Dworkin, Law’s Empire, 102. 
 31 Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, 1, 18-19, 278-279. I paraphrase primarily from the 
following passage by Finnis: “My purpose has not been to explain an unfocused ‘ordinary concept’ 
but to develop a concept for use in a theoretical explanation of a set of human actions, dispositions, 
interrelationships, and conceptions which (i) hang together as a set by virtue of their adaptation to a 
specifiable set of human needs considered in the light of empirical features of the human condition, 
and (ii) are accordingly found in very varying forms and which varying degrees of suitability for, 
and deliberate or unconscious divergence from, those needs as the fully reasonable person would 
assess them.  To repeat: the intention has been not to explain a concept, but to develop a concept 
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proceed securely without a knowledge of the whole range of human possibilities and 
opportunities, inclinations and capacities, a knowledge that requires the assistance of 
descriptive and analytical social science.”32 Hence, Finnis’s analysis-method is partly 
descriptive (as conceived by Hart and Raz). 
Starting-Points  
Theorists have methodological disagreements about what starting-point(s) should 
theorists follow to generate a set of propositions about the law that produces an accurate and 
adequate account of what the law is. A starting-point is a pretheoretical proposition about 
the law or a related phenomenon that serves as (a part of) the foundation for a set of 
propositions about the law: viz., a point from which a theorist should start or organize an 
account of the law.   
For instance: Hart’s starting-point for his explanatory task is the common knowledge 
Hart attributes to any educated man of the salient features of a modern municipal legal 
                                                                                                                                                
which would explain the various phenomena referred to (in an unfocused way by ‘ordinary talk 
about law—and explain them by showing how they answer (fully or partially) to the standing 
requirement of practical reasonableness relevant to the broad area of human concern and 
interaction.” (Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, 278-279.) Moreover, I emphasize “moral” 
above to clarify for the reader the connection between the term “moral” and Finnis’s expression 
“practical reasonableness.” Finnis writes, “But the term ‘moral’ is of somewhat uncertain 
connotation. So it is preferable to frame our conclusion in terms of practical reasonableness.” 
(Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, 15.) Finnis’s requirements of practical reasonableness are 
no doubt a specific form of moral requirement.   
 32 Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, 18-19. Finnis concludes: “There is thus a mutual 
though not quite symmetrical interdependence between the project of describing human affairs by 
way of theory and the project of evaluation human options with a view, at least remotely, to acting 
reasonably and well. The evaluations are in no way deduced from the descriptions; but one whose 
knowledge of the facts of the human situation is very limited is unlikely to judge will in discerning 
the practical implication of the basic values. Equally, the descriptions are not deduced from the 
evaluations; but without the evaluations one cannot determine what descriptions are really 
illumination and significant.” (Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, 19.) 
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system, which, to sum, are various rules and institutions of a legal system.33 Ultimately, 
Hart believes an analysis of the law should start by explaining the contrast between guiding 
the conduct of officials and citizens of a municipality by various rules of a legal system 
versus by various forms of commands and coercions.34 As a result, to carry out his 
explanatory enterprise, Hart uses a number of concepts to denote the various types of rule of 
a legal system: e.g., duty-imposing rules, power-conferring rules, rules of recognition, rules 
of change, and primary and secondary rules.   
However, Raz believes an analysis of the law should start by explaining the contrast 
between guiding the conduct of officials and citizens of a municipality by the various 
reasons for action that various norms (or rules) of a legal system provide versus by the 
various reasons for actions that commands, promises, and other norms (that belong to other 
institutionalized or non-institutionalized normative systems) provide. That is not to suggest 
that Raz does not use a host of Hart’s concepts to denote the various norms of a legal 
system. He does indeed. In addition, Raz uses concepts to denote the various types of 
reasons for actions: first-order reasons, second-order reasons, and exclusionary reasons, to 
name a few. The difference between Hart’s and Raz’s starting-points is subtle: Hart believes 
that the various rules of a legal system should be explanatory primary, whereas Raz believes 
                                                 
 33 Hart, Concept of Law, 3, 240. The term “educated man” is original to Hart. An educated 
person, as the term Hart uses in Concept of Law, is not synonymous with an individual who is a 
lawyer, judge, or legal theorist, all of whom Hart would expect to have professional or expert 
knowledge of the law. An educated person appear to be nothing more than an individual with 
general familiarity in comparative law and civics: viz., a person who is at least understands that the 
laws of a community form some sort of a system and that many separate communities in the world 
share similar structural features in spite of important differences. Thus, Hart understands himself to 
be setting a low standard of who is capable of roughly pinpointing the essential features of municipal 
legal systems. 
 34 Hart, Concept of Law, 38-42. 
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that the various reasons for actions that the various norms of a legal system provide should 
be explanatory primary.   
Dworkin believes that a constructive interpretation of the law entails imposing a 
purpose or point on law to show it “in its best light.” A constructive interpretation of law 
should be given in terms of the abstract point or function the law that Dworkin imposes: 
namely, to regulate and justify use of collective force by government.35  According to 
Dworkin, the preinterpretive (or pretheoretical) proposition about the point of the law is “an 
abstract account that organizes further argument about law’s character.”36  Ascribing a 
purpose on law, then, is necessary for the constructive interpretation process to get 
underway.37  Only after a theorist ascribes a purpose to the law can the theorist interpret the 
law constructively.38   
                                                 
 35 Dworkin, Law’s Empire, 93. To use Dworkin’s words: “Our discussions about law by and 
large assume, I suggest, that the most abstract and fundamental point of legal practice is to guide and 
constrain the power of government in the following way. Law insists that force not be used or 
withheld expect as licensed or required by individual rights and responsibilities flowing from the 
past political decisions about when collective force is justified.” 
 36 Dworkin, Law’s Empire, 93. 
 37 Cf. Dickson, Evaluation and Legal Theory, 105. 
 38 Moreover, Dworkin believes that a constructive interpretation of the law entails that the 
theorist or participant have an “interpretative attitude” towards the social practice, such as the law. 
An interpretive attitude has two components. The first is the assumption that a social practice does 
not simply exist but has value: viz., “that it serves some interest or purpose or enforces some 
principle—in short, that it has some point—that can be stated independently of just describing the 
rules that make up the practice.” (Dworkin, Law’s Empire, 47.) The second is the further assumption 
the requirements of a social practice, which, for Dworkin, refer to the conduct it requires or 
judgments it warrants, “are not necessarily or exclusively what they have always been taken to be 
but are instead sensitive to its point, so that the strict rules must be understood or applied or 
extended or modified or qualified or limited by that point.” (Dworkin, Law’s Empire, 47.) Dworkin 
writes, “Once this interpretive attitude takes hold… [p]eople now try to impose meaning on the 
institution—to see it in its best light—and then to restructure it in the light of that meaning.” 
(Dworkin, Law’s Empire, 47.) Thus, those two components of theorists’ or participants’ interpretive 
attitude, I believe, is important part of the foundation of Dworkin’s theory of law, that is, another 
starting-point. 
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Finnis’s starting-point for his explanatory and morally evaluative analysis of law is 
multifaceted. Finnis writes, “There are human goods that can be secured only through the 
institutions of human law, and requirements of practical reasonableness that only those 
institutions can satisfy.”39 First, a theorist should identify those goods. Second, a theorist 
should identify those requirements of practical reasonableness. For Finnis, a theorist cannot 
begin a theoretical description and analysis of the institution of human law, until the theorist 
“also participates in the work of evaluation, of understanding what is really good for human 
persons, and what is really required by practical reasonableness.”40 Finnis claims, “For the 
theorist cannot identify the central case of that practical viewpoint which he uses to identify 
the central case of his subject-matter, unless he decides what the requirements of practical 
reasonableness really are, in relation to this whole aspect of human affairs and concerns.”41 
Without the first two dimensions, the theorist cannot even identify the viewpoint that Finnis 
believes a theorist should undertake to identify the central case of law accurately and 
adequately. Third, a theorist should accept the law as having the function of guiding the 
conduct of officials and citizens of a community in accordance with those requirements of 
practical reasonableness and thereby securing those social goods that require the 
coordination of a community because a community cannot secure those social goods, easily 
or at all, without it.42 For Finnis, an analysis of law should be in terms of the social goods, 
the requirements of practical reasonableness, and the function of law that Finnis ascribes. 
                                                 
 39 Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, 3. 
 40 Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, 3. 
 41 Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, 15. 
 42 Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, 1, 14-15. In addition, cf. Dickson, Evaluation and 
Legal Theory, 8-9, 46-47; and Bix, Jurisprudence, 74. 
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Participant-Perspectives 
A third example is theorists’ methodological disagreement about what participant-
perspective(s) or viewpoint(s) should theorists follow to generate a set of propositions about 
the law that produces an accurate and adequate account of what the law is. A participant-
perspective is a community member’s beliefs, judgments, attitudes, and/or understandings 
about the law: viz., the perspective or viewpoint of a judge, lawyer, citizen, anarchist, or 
“bad man,” to name a few. A theorist decides to adopt or observe a participant-perspective 
as data to explain or an experience to participate in for the theorist’s analysis of the law. A 
theorist decides to accept a particular participant-perspective instead of an alternative 
because the theorist believes that adopting or observing that participant-perspective is 
necessary to explain what the law is accurately and adequately. A theorist’s selection of a 
participant-perspective further narrows what is significant or necessary for the theorist to 
explain in an analysis of law. The basis for a theorist’s selection of a participant-perspective 
is his other methodological commitments, such as an analysis-method, a starting-point, a 
checking-point (which I discuss below), in addition to the various interests or problem that 
trouble him at the time.43     
For instance: In an analysis of law, Hart believes that a theorist should observe and 
explain the participants who accept an “internal point of view” towards the rules of a legal 
system. According to Hart, those participants “are the officials, lawyers, or private persons 
who use them, in one situation after another, as guides to the conduct of social life, as the 
basis for claims, demands, admissions, criticisms, or punishment, viz., in all the familiar 
                                                 
 43 Cf. Bix, Jurisprudence, 4. 
 20
transactions of life according to rules.”44 In doing a descriptive analysis of law, Hart states 
that a theorist “does not as such himself share the participants’ acceptance of the law in 
these ways, but [the theorist] can and should describe such acceptance.”45 In other words, in 
a “descriptive” analysis of law, Hart believes that a theorist should understand what is for 
participants to adopt the internal point of view, without accepting, endorsing, or 
condemning the participants’ internal point of view.46 Raz accepts a participant-perspective 
for his analysis of the law that is similar to Hart’s internal point of view. Thus, to use Raz’s 
words: “It falls to legal theory to pick on those [feature of the social phenomenon] which are 
central and significant to the way the concept plays its role in people’s understanding of 
society, to elaborate and explain them,”47 that is, “to advance our understanding of society 
by helping us understand how people understand themselves.”48  
In contrast to Hart and Raz, in a constructive interpretation of law, Dworkin believes 
that a theorist should theorize as if the theorist is a participant in the social practice, namely, 
the law. For a constructive interpretation of a social practice, such as the law, Dworkin 
believes that “a social scientist [or theorist] must participate in [the] social practice if he 
hopes to understand it, as distinguished from understanding its members.”49 Dworkin writes, 
“So, no firm line divides jurisprudence from adjudication or any other aspect of legal 
practice.”50  Dworkin’s interpretive analysis of law is a participation in law, which, for 
                                                 
 44 Hart, Concept of Law, 90. 
 45 Hart, Concept of Law, 242 (brackets added). 
 46 Hart, Concept of Law, 242. 
 47 Raz, Ethics in the Public Domain, 237 (brackets added). 
 48 Raz, Ethics in the Public Domain, 237. 
 49 Dworkin, Law’s Empire, 55 (brackets added). 
 50 Dworkin, Law’s Empire, 90. 
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Dworkin, necessarily involves moral evaluation and justification of the law instead of 
descriptive explanation of the law.   
In contrast to Hart, Raz, and Dworkin, Finnis believes that a theorist should explain 
and thereby morally evaluate the law as if a theoretical practically reasonable participant. 
Finnis states, “If there is a viewpoint in which the institution of the Rule of Law, and 
compliance with rules and principles of law according to their tenor, are regarded as at least 
presumptive requirements of practical reasonableness itself, such a viewpoint is the 
viewpoint which should be used as the standard of reference by the theorist describing the 
features of legal order.”51 However, among those participants that regard law from a 
practical viewpoint as an aspect of practical reasonableness, Finnis believes that “there will 
be some whose views about what practical reasonable actually requires in this domain are, 
in detail, more reasonable than others.”52 Thus, Finnis adopts the viewpoint of the 
participants “who not only appeal to practical reasonableness but also are practically 
reasonable.”53  Finnis’s analysis of law is in terms of a participant who commits to the 
requirements of practical reasonableness and who appeals to those requirements to 
understand what the law is. 
Checking-Points 
A fourth example is theorists’ methodological disagreements about what checking-
point(s) should theorists satisfy to generate a set of propositions about the law that produces 
an accurate and adequate account of what the law is. A checking-point is a pretheoretical 
                                                 
 51 Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, 15. 
 52 Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, 15. 
 53 Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, 15. 
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intuition or proposition about the law or a related phenomenon that a theorist should explain 
for an account that furthers our understanding of what the law is. Unlike a starting-point, a 
checking-point usually is not part of the foundation on which a theorist generates an account 
of the law and thereby usually is not necessary for a theorist to begin an analysis of the law. 
Some theorists compare attempts to satisfy checking-points to intuition matching because a 
theorist constructs a set of propositions about the law to match the theorist’s pretheoretical 
intuitions concerning the subject.54   
For instance: Raz accepts as a checking-point that an analysis of the law should 
explain the way in which our ordinary concept of law allows for the possibility of moral (or 
just) and immoral (or unjust) legal rules, which provide reasons for actions regardless of 
their moral soundness or acceptability, in legal system of a community. Raz believes that 
our concept or law could designate as legal system that contains immoral legal rules (or 
laws) as the law. According to Raz, many people do not rule out particular laws in the legal 
system of their community as non-laws, which provide no reasons for actions, when those 
laws are immoral.55 Thus, for Raz, an explanation of the law should account for how people 
can believe that the law of their community is still the law, even if they believe the law is 
morally unsound or unacceptable. However, Raz writes, “While rejecting any explanation of 
the nature of law… which is true only if the law is morally good, we must also reject any 
explanation which fails to make it intelligible.”56  Raz assumes that, “while the law may be 
morally indefensible, it must be understood as a system which many people believe to be 
                                                 
 54 See Leiter, “Realism, Hard Positivism, and Conceptual Analysis,” 546-547; and Leiter, 
“Beyond the Hart/Dworkin Debate,” 43-51. 
 55 Raz, Practical Reason and Norms, 164.   
 56 Raz, “Intention and Interpretation,” 260. 
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morally defensible.”57  For Raz, then, an account of the law also “must explain how people 
can believe that their law, the law of their country, is morally good.”58 
Dworkin accepts a checking-point that requires a theorist to explain the theoretical 
disagreements about law that judges and lawyers (i.e., participants of the legal practice) 
actually do have.59 Dworkin believes that theoretical disagreements concern the grounds of 
law, which is comprised of various propositions of historical fact and political morality. For 
Dworkin, “propositions of law” are “all the various statements and claims people make 
about what the law allows or prohibits or entitles them to have.”60  According to Dworkin, 
propositions can very general (e.g., “the law forbids states to deny anyone equal protections 
within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment”), or much less general (e.g., “the law 
does not provide compensation for fellow-servant injuries”), or very concrete (e.g., “the law 
requires Acme Corporation to compensate John Smith for the injury he suffered in it employ 
last February”).61 Dworkin believes “[l]awyers and judges… assume that some propositions 
of law, at least, can be true or false.”62 Whether propositions are true  depends on “other, 
more familiar kinds of propositions,” which Dworkin calls “the grounds of law.” Thus, for 
Dworkin, to account for lawyers and judges theoretical disagreements, a theorist must 
explain how lawyers and judges “might disagree about the grounds of law, about which 
other kinds of propositions, which if true, make a particular proposition of law true.”63 
                                                 
 57 Raz, “Intention and Interpretation,” 260. 
 58 Raz, “Intention and Interpretation,” 260. 
 59 Dworkin, Law’s Empire, 46-47. 
 60 Dworkin, Law’s Empire, 4. 
 61 Dworkin, Law’s Empire, 4. 
 62 Dworkin, Law’s Empire, 4 (brackets added and note omitted). 
 63 Dworkin, Law’s Empire, 5. 
 24
III.    THE SECOND FACTOR OF THE METHODOLOGY CONFLICT 
Heretofore, I showed that Hart, Raz, Finnis, and Dworkin endorse and follow 
different methodological guidelines (at least concerning the four categories that I illustrated 
above) to provide an accurate and adequate legal theory that furthers our understanding of 
the law. If nothing else, F1 establishes that in jurisprudence (a) different methodologies 
exist and (b) each theorist believes that at least his legal theory should satisfy the 
methodology he endorses. Nevertheless, theorists’ disagreement about S2 is more complex 
than the conclusion that each theorist follows the methodology he endorses when generating 
a theory of law. Theorists respond to the diverse methodologies with opposing approaches: 
namely, imperialism and relativism.   
I believe that theorists’ commitment to rival approaches in response to the diverse 
methodologies (i.e., F2) fully develops the complex character of the methodology conflict.   
I explain imperialism and relativism in Section III.A and Section III.B, respectively. I 
demonstrate that a theorist’s commitment to imperialism or relativism affects two issues:  
(1) whether he believes theorists should accept one methodology or multiple methodologies 
to provide an accurate and adequate account of the law and (2) whether he believes all 
theorists or some theorists should follow the accepted methodology or methodologies. The 
different responses that imperialism and relativism provide for these two issues are central 
to understanding the complex character of theorists’ disagreement about S2.64 
 
                                                 
 64 To be sure, I do not want to offer criticism or praise of either approach under investigation at 
this time. I only want to describe and exemplify the central features of each approach. Later, in the 
next two sections, I discuss and comment on the implications of imperialism and relativism for 
theorists’ debate about S1. 
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A.    Imperialism 
Theorists that accept imperialism (who I call imperialists) in response to the diverse 
methodologies in jurisprudence claim supremacy for one particular methodology as the 
most or only important way to understand what the law is accurately and adequately.65 
Imperialists attempt to demonstrate that all theorists should follow a single methodology to 
further our understanding of the law.66  “The practice of this widely-held ‘winner take all’ 
commitment involves the attempt either to exclude or disvalue alternative [methodologies],” 
explains Michael Giudice, “by showing that such [methodologies] will miss or distort what 
is important about law and its legal practice.”67 While imperialists agree about the approach 
to deal with or respond to theorists’ methodological differences, many imperialists disagree 
about which methodology to accept as the proper methodology. In this subsection, I provide 
examples of a few theorists—namely, Finnis, Dworkin, and Leiter—that each accept 
imperialism and yet differ as to which methodology he believes all theorists should follow 
to generate a legal theory that furthers our understanding of the law.   
For example, Finnis accepts imperialism and claims his methodology is the most or 
only important methodology for all theorists to endorse and satisfy. According to Finnis, his 
evaluative or normative starting-points and analysis-method are far superior for 
jurisprudence than the methodologies of his rivals. In a recent article, Finnis argues that “the 
primary reality of law” is the proper focus and starting-point for all theorists to adopt in 
                                                 
 65 Cf. Giudice, “Understanding Diversity,” 510. 
 66 Cf. Giudice, “Understanding Diversity,” 509. 
 67 Giudice, “Understanding Diversity,” 510 (brackets added). I replaced “approaches” with the 
first brackets and “approaches and methods” with the second brackets. I replaced these terms with 
equivalent terms that are consistent with the terminology I use in this thesis.  
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jurisprudence.68 Finnis writes, “The primary reality of the law is… in its claim, as itself a 
moral requirement, on my deliberating about what to decide—that is, what to judge about 
the options available to me, and what to choose and do once I have made my judgment. This 
mode of our positive law’s existence—as a morally legitimate and compelling, albeit 
conditionally and only defeasibly compelling, claim on my action when I am thinking what 
to do as a plain citizen (child or adult), a judge, a police officer, a tax inspector, or executor, 
and so forth—is the primary reality of law.”69 For Finnis, the primary reality of law is 
neither in its necessarily true properties nor in its officials’ and subjects’ (e.g., judges, 
lawyers, and citizens) understandings of or attitudes toward it, which are central subjects in 
methodological guidelines accepted by Hart and Raz.70 In addition, the primary reality of 
law is not in its officials’ and subjects’ experiences or behaviors in terms of either cause and 
effect or patterns of recurrence, which are central subjects in methodological guidelines 
adopted by Richard Posner and Brian Leiter.71   
According to Finnis, the law’s claim as a moral requirement “is primary because the 
rational force of this claim is fully intelligible even before one knows anything much about 
the content of the law and certainly before one has been taught anything about law in 
general or ‘the concept of law.’”72 Finnis believes the primary reality of law justifies his 
claim of supremacy for his methodology as the proper methodology to follow in order to 
produce a legal theory that furthers our understanding of the law. Finnis writes, “In short, a 
                                                 
 68 Compare example with Giudice, “Understanding Diversity,” 512-513. 
 69 Finnis, “Law and What I Truly Should Decide,” 112-113. 
 70 Finnis, “Law and What I Truly Should Decide,” 112. 
 71 Finnis, “Law and What I Truly Should Decide,” 112. 
 72 Finnis, “Law and What I Truly Should Decide,” 113. 
 27
complete and fully realistic theory of law can be and in all essentials has been worked out 
from the starting point of the one hundred percent normative question, what should I decide 
to do…. I can think of no interesting project of inquiry left over for a philosophical theory 
of law with any different starting point.”73  Thus, for Finnis, a theorist that adopts a different 
starting-point by which to begin a legal theory will miss something important or necessary 
to explain what the law is accurately and adequately.   
However, Leiter claims that “Finnis admits… that positivism—understood either in 
Hart’s or Raz’s version—gives an adequate account of [quoting Finnis] ‘what any 
competent lawyer… would say are (or are not) intra-systemically valid laws, imposing legal 
requirements.’”74 If Leiter is correct, Finnis’s admission would be contrary to imperialism: 
viz., that different methodologies—at least ones that involve a general and descriptive 
analysis-method of the sort that Hart and Raz endorse—could also produce an accurate and 
adequate theory of law. In response to Leiter, Finnis writes: “But I made no admission about 
the ‘adequacy’ of anyone’s account.”75  Finnis is “far from admitting that a normatively 
                                                 
 73 Finnis, “Law and What I Truly Should Decide,” 115 (emphasis added).  
 74 Leiter, “Beyond the Hart/Dworkin Debate,” 28-29 (brackets added). Finnis’s statement in full 
context is as follows: “Positivism never coherently reaches beyond reporting attitudes and 
convergent behaviour (perhaps the sophisticated and articulate attitudes that constitute a set of rules 
of recognition, change, and adjudication). It has nothing to say to officials or private citizens who 
want to judge whether, when, and why the authority and obligatoriness claimed and enforced by 
those who are acting as officials of a legal system, and by their directives, are indeed authoritative 
reasons for their own conscientious action. Positivism does no more than repeat (1) what any 
competent lawyer—including every legally competent adherent of natural law theory—would say 
are (or are not) intra-systemically valid laws, imposing ‘legal requirements,’ and (2) what any street-
wise observer would warn are the likely consequences of non-compliance. It cannot explain the 
authoritativeness, for an official’s or a private citizen’s conscience (ultimate rational judgment), of 
these alleged and imposed requirements, nor their lack of such authority when radically unjust. 
Positivism is in the last analysis redundant.” (Finnis, “On the Incoherence of Legal Positivism,” 
1611.) 
 75 Finnis, “Law and What I Truly Should Decide,” 122. 
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inert description of law gives an adequate account of anything.”76  Finnis believes that a 
general and descriptive analysis-method “gives no account, no theory or what Hart would 
call elucidation or explanation, at all, let alone an adequate one.”77   
In contrast to Finnis, Dworkin asserts that his starting-point is a necessary part of the 
proper methodology for all theorists to endorse and follow. Julie Dickson in Evaluation and 
Legal Theory best characterizes Dworkin’s imperialist commitment to his preinterpretive 
proposition about the function or point of law. According to Dickson, one would not 
necessarily suspect that Dworkin accepts imperialism in response to different starting-points 
from the manner in which he introduces his staring-point in Law’s Empire. Dworkin seems 
keen to play down its significance and possible implications, explains Dickson, “presenting 
it merely as a starting point which is necessary in order to get us all into the same 
interpretive ballpark.”78 Dworkin describes his preinterpretive proposition about the 
function of law as “an abstract account that organizes further argument about law’s 
character,” which is “suitably airy” and “sufficiently abstract and uncontroversial.”79 
However, for Dickson, Dworkin appears to believe that espousing his view of law’s 
function “is essential to any adequate legal theory.”80  For example, Dworkin claims legal 
                                                 
 76 Finnis, “Law and What I Truly Should Decide,” 123. 
 77 Finnis, “Law and What I Truly Should Decide,” 123. Finnis writes, “The aspiration to be 
normatively inert makes it impossible to provide any explanation of the kind Hart was seeking 
throughout his work.” (Finnis, “Law and What I Truly Should Decide,” 123.) This is the reason why 
Finnis believe legal positivism is incoherent. Finnis explains the incoherence of legal positivism as 
“its inherent and self-imposed incapacity to succeed in the explanatory task it sets itself.” (Finnis, 
“On the Incoherence of Legal Positivism,” 1608.) For further explanation on the sense in which a 
descriptive analysis-method makes a theory of law impossible, see my discussion of imperialism in 
Section V.A. 
 78 Dickson, Evaluation and Legal Theory, 107. 
 79 See Dworkin, Law’s Empire, 93-94. 
 80 Dickson, Evaluation and Legal Theory, 113. 
 29
theories authored by Hart and Raz, who accept different starting-points, must understand the 
law as having the function of justifying state coercion if their legal theories are to be 
plausible accounts of the law.81 Dworkin believes that “[a] conception of law must explain 
how what it takes to be law provides a general justification for the exercise of coercive 
power by the state.”82  Dickson concludes that Dworkin allows no alternative starting-point 
to his own: viz., “all legal theories which are worth considering seriously presuppose or 
depend upon arguments about law’s function which are broadly similar to those advocated 
in his own theory.”83 
In addition, Dworkin believes his analysis-method is far superior for jurisprudence 
than the analysis-methods of his rivals. For Dworkin, “[g]eneral theories of law… are 
constructive interpretations: they try to show legal practice as a whole in its best light, to 
achieve equilibrium between legal practice as they find it and the best justification of that 
practice.”84 Dworkin claims that the various social-scientific and morally neutral analysis-
methods’ “emphasis on fact and strategy ended by distorting jurisprudential issues in much 
the same way as the English doctrinal approach distorted them, that is, by eliminating just 
those issues of moral principle that form their core.”85 Dworkin, that is, believes that social-
scientific analysis-methods (endorsed by Posner and Leiter) and descriptive analysis-
methods (endorsed by Hart and Raz) are unacceptable methodological guidelines because 
each misses or distorts what is important or necessary to explain about the law. “If 
                                                 
 81 Dworkin, Law’s Empire, 429-430 note 3; and cf. Dickson, Evaluation and Legal Theory, 113. 
 82 Dworkin, Law’s Empire, 190 (emphasis added and brackets added). 
 83 Dickson, Evaluation and Legal Theory, 113. 
 84 Dworkin, Law’s Empire, 90 (brackets added). 
 85 Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, 4. 
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jurisprudence is to succeed,” according to Dworkin, “it must expose these issues [of moral 
principle] and attack them as issues of moral theory.”86  Thus, for Dworkin, his analysis-
method, which is interpretive and justificatory, and not social-scientific and morally neutral, 
is the only or best way to explain what the law is accurately and adequately.   
In contrast to Finnis and Dworkin, Leiter asserts that his social-scientific analysis-
method is a necessary part of the proper methodology for all theorists to endorse and follow. 
Leiter endorses a social-scientific analysis of the law for jurisprudence, which he calls “the 
naturalist method.” Leiter believes the naturalist method comprises of two subsidiary theses. 
First, the substantive thesis: “[w]ith respect to questions about what there is and what we 
can know, we have nothing better to go on than successful scientific theory.”87  Second, the 
methodological thesis: “[i]nsofar as philosophy is concerned with what there is and what we 
can know, it must operate as the abstract branch of successful scientific theory.”88  For 
Leiter, the best explanation of law “is the one that figures in the most fruitful a posteriori 
research programs (i.e., the ones that give us the best going account of how the world 
work)”:89 that is, the account of what law must be if current successful scientific theory is to 
be true and explanatory.90 
Leiter reveals his imperialist commitment to his the naturalist method in a two-step 
argument that attempts to eliminate other analysis-methods (such as those endorsed by Hart, 
Raz, Finnis, and Dworkin) as acceptable ways to investigate and explain the law. The first 
                                                 
 86 Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, 7 (brackets added). 
 87 Leiter, “Beyond the Hart/Dworkin Debate,” 49 (brackets added). 
 88 Leiter, “Beyond the Hart/Dworkin Debate,” 49 (brackets added). 
 89 Leiter, “Realism, Hard Positivism, and Conceptual Analysis,” 547. 
 90 See Leiter, “Beyond the Hart/Dworkin Debate,” 49, 51. For further explanation of Leiter’s 
analysis-method, see Leiter, “Toward a Naturalized Jurisprudence.” 
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step of Leiter’s argument attacks the sort of analysis-method that Hart and Raz endorse. His 
concern about a general and descriptive analysis-method is not that “it is descriptive—of 
course it is (or tries to be)—but rather that it relies on two central argumentative devices—
analyses of concepts and appeals to intuition—that are epistemologically bankrupt,” 
explains Leiter.91 He thinks “epistemic values conjoined with Hart’s dominant methods—
conceptual analysis and appeals to intuition—can deliver no more than ethnographically 
relative results.”92  While contemporary philosophers occasionally give “a polite nod” to 
W.V.O. Quine’s seminal attack on the analytic-synthetic distinction,93 which Leiter uses to 
support his argument, he believes theorists in jurisprudence do not take its consequences 
seriously enough: “namely that the claims of conceptual analysis are always vulnerable to 
the demands of a posteriori theory construction.”94 For Leiter, things should not be any 
different in legal philosophy. “Philosophy becomes unsatisfying…,” writes Leiter, “when it 
                                                 
 91 Leiter, “Beyond the Hart/Dworkin Debate,” 43-44.   
 92 Leiter, “Beyond the Hart/Dworkin Debate,” 51. 
 93 To sum Quine’s argument, Leiter writes: “Philosophers long thought that some truths were 
necessary while others were contingent; in the twentieth century, under the influence of logical 
positivism, this was taken to be the distinction between those statements that were ‘true in virtue of 
meaning’ (hence necessarily true) and those that were ‘true in virtue of fact’ (hence only 
contingently true). The former ‘analytic’ truths were the proper domain of philosophy; the latter 
‘synthetic’ truths the proper domain of empirical science. Quine argued that the distinction could not 
be sustained: all statements are, in principle, answerable to experience, and, conversely, all 
statements can be maintained in the face of recalcitrant experience as long as we adjust other parts of 
our picture of the world. So there is no real distinction between claims that are ‘true in virtue of 
meaning’ and ‘true in virtue of facts,’ or between ‘necessary’ and ‘contingent’ truths; there is simply 
the socio-historical fact that, at any given point in the history of inquiry, there are some statements 
we are unlikely to give up in the face of recalcitrant empirical evidence, and others that we are quite 
willing to give up when empirical evidence conflicts.” (Leiter, “Beyond the Hart/Dworkin Debate,” 
44.)   
 94 Leiter, “Realism, Hard Positivism, and Conceptual Analysis,” 546 (note omitted). 
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turns into intuition-mongering and armchair sociology about what is really fundamental to 
‘our’ concepts.”95  His solution is to turn to successful social scientific theory. 
The second step of Leiter’s argument attacks the other opposing analysis-method (in 
contrast to his own) to a general and descriptive analysis method: namely, the normative 
sort that Finnis and Dworkin endorse. According to Leiter, theorists who endorse a 
normative type of analysis-method usually believe “epistemic values are not enough to 
demarcate [their] subject-matter.”96  Their solution is to turn to moral evaluation of law to 
demarcate the object of jurisprudential inquiry. In comparison with his solution, Leiter 
somewhat rhetorically asks the following: in figuring out what the law is (essentially), 
should theorists turn to morality or to science?97  Leiter writes, “I think the answer is clear,” 
saving the argument for a different occasion.98  I understand the correct answer to be science 
for Leiter, which, in effect, claims superiority over a normative type of analysis-method.   
To conclude, imperialists seek to command or establish the acceptance of one 
methodology as the proper methodology. Each imperialist requires all theorists to follow the 
methodology he (the imperialist) endorses in order to produce a single and complete legal 
theory that furthers our understanding of what the law is. For example, suppose β (an 
imperialist) endorses a particular methodology, say M1. β, under imperialism, believes all 
theorists should follow M1 to provide an accurate and adequate theory of law. If α (a 
theorist) endorses and follows another methodology (other than M1), β would automatically 
                                                 
 95 Leiter, “Realism, Hard Positivism, and Conceptual Analysis,” 546 (note omitted). 
 96 Leiter, “Beyond the Hart/Dworkin Debate,” 51 (brackets added). 
 97 Leiter, “Beyond the Hart/Dworkin Debate,” 51. 
 98 Leiter, “Beyond the Hart/Dworkin Debate,” 51. 
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conclude α’s legal theory is inaccurate and inadequate in some way because α will miss or 
distort what is important or necessary to explain about the law. 
B.    Relativism 
However, not all theorists accept imperialism. Some theorists believe relativism is 
the appropriate response to theorists’ methodological differences. Theorists that accept 
relativism (who I call relativists) believe theorists’ methodologies can, do, and should differ 
in their various fundamental subjects, projects, and approaches to understand the law in 
diverse ways.99 “Once one sees that different theorists are answering different questions and 
responding to different concerns”—that different theorists accept different methodologies 
by which to generate an account of the law—“one can see how these theorists are often 
describing disparate aspects of the same phenomenon,” explains Brian Bix in 
Jurisprudence.100 Relativists view each unique methodology as a partial and important way 
to further our understanding of what the law is.101    The practice of relativism involves 
showing that methodologies are different from each other, but nonetheless are compatible or 
continuous with each other.   
For example, in the “Postscript” to the second edition of Concept of Law, Hart 
distinguishes Dworkin’s methodology from his methodology. According to Hart, legal 
theory conceived in a manner as both general and descriptive (such as his methodology) “is 
a radically different enterprise from Dworkin’s conception of legal theory… as in part 
evaluative and justificatory and as ‘addressed to a particular legal culture,’ which is usually 
                                                 
 99 Cf. Giudice, “Understanding Diversity,” 515. 
 100 Bix, Jurisprudence, 3. 
 101 Cf. Giudice, “Understanding Diversity,” 523. 
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the theorist’s own and in Dworkin’s case is that of Anglo-American law.”102 “It is not 
obvious why there should be or indeed could be any significant conflict between enterprises 
so different as my own and Dworkin’s conception of legal theory,” writes Hart.103  He 
believes that “the partly evaluative [and justificatory] issues which Dworkin calls 
‘interpretive’ are not the only proper issues for jurisprudence and legal theory, and that there 
is an important place for general and descriptive jurisprudence.”104 Hart resolves their 
methodological differences with an approach contrary to imperialism: he rejects Dworkin’s 
methodology as being the only important or proper methodology for jurisprudence, but not 
as being a partial and important way to understand the law. His position here suggests he 
accepts relativism: namely, that each theorist can and should follow the methodology he 
endorses in order to produce a partial and important legal theory that furthers our 
understanding of the law in diverse way.   
Relativists accept a principle explicitly or implicitly, which I call the principle of 
methodological relativity: a legal theory is (and should be understood) relative to the 
methodology that the theorist (who generated the set of propositions about the law) 
endorses. “The possibility that claims in legal theory may sometimes be relative to a 
particular purpose or a particular viewpoint does not empty legal theory of all significance 
or interest. I think the opposite may be true,” writes Bix.105  The significance of relativism is 
that the accuracy and adequacy of a legal theory is (and should be understood) relative to 
                                                 
 102 Hart, Concept of Law, 240 (note omitted). I clarified this methodological difference and 
several others between Hart and Dworkin in Section II.B. I need not reiterate each here. 
 103 Hart, Concept of Law, 241. 
 104 Hart, Concept of Law, 243 (brackets added). 
 105 Bix, Jurisprudence, 4. 
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the methodology that the theorist (who generated the set of propositions about the law) 
endorses. For example, Hart provides a potentially accurate and adequate general and 
descriptive legal theory, whereas Dworkin provides a potentially accurate and adequate 
particular and interpretive legal theory. While relativism in jurisprudence has similarities 
with relativism in other philosophical contents, Bix believes “it is also compatible with a 
more traditional approach to truth.”106  Relativists in jurisprudence need not suggest that 
many truths exist, “only that the truth about a complex social or moral phenomenon is 
unlikely to be captured completely by any single theory [and methodology] alone.”107 
Once one understands that diverse methodologies are often present in completing 
analyses of law, Bix believes “one can understand why some ‘debates’ in the jurisprudential 
literature are best understood as theorists talking past one another.”108 Similarly, Michael 
Giudice claims that failure to distinguish or insensitivity to different methodologies “often 
leads us to see and think in terms of conflicts where conflicts do not really exist.”109  
Nonetheless, Bix qualifies that “[i]t is important to emphasize, though, that not all 
arguments in legal theory can be so cleanly and peacefully resolved.”110  In other words, 
different legal theories that possess different methodologies are not necessarily compatible 
or continuous theories of law in virtue of their methodological differences.  
                                                 
 106 Bix, Jurisprudence, 4 at note 3. 
 107 Bix, Jurisprudence, 4 at note 3 (brackets added). To be sure, Bix uses “theory” here to refer 
to “a set of propositions about the law,” “an explanation of the law,” “an account of the law,” etc. I 
think adding “methodology” to Bix’s statement is appropriate given the context of his discussion.   
 108 Bix, Jurisprudence, 9. 
 109 Giudice, “Understanding Diversity,” 515. 
 110 Bix, Jurisprudence, 4. 
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To conclude, relativists seek to establish the acceptance of each unique methodology 
as one partial and important way to understand the law. For relativists, a theorist can and 
should follow the methodology he endorses to provide a partial and important legal theory 
that furthers our understanding of what law is in a diverse way. For example, suppose β (a 
relativist) endorses a particular methodology, say M2. β, under relativism, believes that at 
least he should follow M2 to produce an accurate and adequate theory of law. In contrast to 
an imperialist, if α (a theorist) endorses and follows another methodology (other than M2),  
β would not automatically conclude α’s legal theory is inaccurate and inadequate in some 
way  because α will miss or distort what is important or necessary to explain about the law. 
β believes α’s methodology—like M2—is one partial, important, and unique way to 
understand the law. 
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IV.    WHY RESOLVE THE METHODOLOGY CONFLICT FIRST 
Today, most theorists acknowledge their disagreement about S2 contributes in some 
way to their dispute about S1. In the previous two sections, drawing on literature by Hart, 
Raz, Finnis, Dworkin, Leiter, and other theorists, I illustrated the two factors that contribute 
to theorists’ disagreement about S2: F1 and F2. The two factors explain the complex 
character of the methodology conflict. Theorists endorse different methodologies (F1), but, 
while every theorist believes his legal theory should follow the methodology he endorses, 
not every theorist believes all legal theories should follow the methodology he endorses 
(F2). I explained that F2 develops the normative dimension of the methodology conflict: an 
imperialist believes each legal theory should satisfy the methodology he (the imperialist) 
endorses, whereas a relativist believes each legal theory should satisfy the methodology the 
theorist (who constructed the set of propositions about the law under review) endorses. If 
nothing else, theorists’ disagreement about S2 creates confusion about which methodology 
each legal theory should satisfy to provide an accurate and adequate theory of law, which, in 
turn, fuels their dispute about S1.   
A key part of achieving a common answer to the question “what is law?” involves 
theorists evaluating the accuracy and adequacy of each other’s legal theories. However, in 
the face of the methodology conflict, theorists advance towards achieving the primary goal 
of jurisprudence in two directions: directly or indirectly. The direct course works to reach 
agreement about which legal theory is accurate and adequate, without resolving theorists’ 
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disagreement about S2. Hereafter, I term this direct course pragmatism.111 The indirect 
course works to reach agreement about which methodology a legal theory should satisfy to 
be accurate and adequate, before resolving theorists’ disagreement about S1. Answering 
whether theorists should resolve their disagreement about S2 before their dispute about S1 
to accomplish the primary goal is the first task that this thesis’s main question requires.   
I argue in this section that theorists should resolve the methodology conflict first to 
be able to reach a common answer to the question “what is law?”. In Section IV.A, I clarify 
theorists’ goals, forms, and procedures for evaluating the accuracy and adequacy of legal 
theories. In Section IV.B, I show that accepting pragmatism in response to the methodology 
conflict is an insufficient approach to achieve the primary goal because theorists cannot 
agree about which legal theory is accurate and adequate unless they agree about which 
methodology a legal theory should satisfy to be accurate and adequate. 
A.    An Overview of Theorists’ Examinations 
Evaluating the accuracy and adequacy of each other’s legal theories is a significant 
way theorists can resolve their disagreement about S1 and, in effect, reach a common 
answer that explains how people should understand what the law is in the community in 
which they live. The independent goal of each theorist’s examination is to determine which 
legal theory is (the most) accurate and adequate and/or whether (and to what extent) a legal 
theory is accurate and adequate. The collective goal of theorists’ examinations is to achieve 
agreement about which legal theory is (the most) accurate and adequate. A determination 
                                                 
 111 I use the term “pragmatism” only for the sake of convenience in this thesis: namely, to 
denote a more direct or practical approach to the primary goal in the sense that it seeks to resolve 
issues about the law and not issues about methodology. The use of the term “pragmatism” in this 
thesis has no connection with any school of thought in philosophy or any other discipline.  
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about which legal theory is (the most) accurate and adequate is essentially a statement about 
how people should understand the law. Agreement about which legal theory is (the most) 
accurate and adequate, accordingly, is tantamount to agreement about how people should 
understand the law (that is, a common answer to the question “what is law?”). Thus, the 
independent goal of each theorist’s examination serves the collective goal of theorists’ 
examinations, which, in turn, serves the primary goal of jurisprudence.   
Typically, theorists evaluate the accuracy and adequacy of legal theories in two 
forms, which I call comparative examination and non-comparative examination. A non-
comparative examination evaluates a single legal theory to determine whether a theorist’s 
set of propositions about the law is accurate and adequate. A non-comparative examination 
involves (a) supporting or (b) criticizing the accuracy and adequacy of a theorist’s set of 
propositions about the law. A comparative examination evaluates at least two legal theories 
in comparison with each other—usually ones that concern similar issues—to determine 
which theorist’s set of propositions about the law is (the most) accurate and adequate. A 
comparative examination involves (a) supporting the accuracy and adequacy of one legal 
theory and (b) criticizing the accuracy and adequacy of any other legal theory.   
Traditionally, when at least two theorists offer different propositions about the law 
concerning an issue, theorists use comparative examination (rather than in non-comparative 
examination) due to a basic intuition: namely, a single accurate and adequate explanation 
exists for each phenomenon or set of phenomena, such as what the law is concerning an 
issue. For example, consider theorists’ disagreement about the connection between the law 
and morality (which I mentioned in Section I). Theorists often evaluate Hart’s and Raz’s 
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propositions, which deny the necessary connection between law and morality, in 
comparison with Finnis’s, Dworkin’s, and Wolff’s propositions, which affirm the necessary 
connection between law and morality, to conclude which explanation of the law and its 
connection with morality is (the most) accurate and adequate. The acceptance of all those 
theorists’ rival propositions about the connection between the law and morality necessitate a 
contradictory understanding of what the law is, at least concerning that issue, which is 
unacceptable.112   
To evaluate the accuracy and adequacy of each other’s legal theories, theorists in 
jurisprudence import methodological guidelines into their comparative and non-comparative 
examinations. Each theorist believes that an accurate and adequate theory of law should 
satisfy his imported methodological guidelines. The imported methodological guidelines are 
a theorist’s grounds and reasons to (a) support or (b) criticize the accuracy and adequacy of 
a legal theory. A theorist (a) supports or (b) criticizes the accuracy and adequacy of a legal 
theory via demonstrating whether the set of propositions about the law (a) satisfies or (b) 
fails his imported methodological guidelines. Each theorist believes that the final 
determination of his comparative or non-comparative examination is legitimate and 
significant because a legal theory must satisfy his imported methodological guidelines to be 
(the most) accurate and adequate. 
                                                 
 112 To be sure, when at least two theorists offer different theories of law concerning an issue, I 
believe the following is true under the basic intuition mentioned above: (1) a theorist cannot prove 
each legal theory is (the most) accurate and adequate, but (2) a theorist can prove each legal theory is 
(to some extent) inaccurate and inadequate. However, neither (1) nor (2) exclude the possibility that 
a theorist can prove that one legal theory is the most accurate and adequate explanation of the law 
concerning an issue. 
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The standard application of methodological guidelines in comparative examinations 
requires a stricter protocol than in non-comparative examinations. In non-comparative 
examinations, a theorist can appeal to any methodological guideline to evaluate whether a 
particular legal theory is accurate and adequate. A theorist need not apply the same 
methodological guideline to examine any other legal theory. In comparative examinations, 
however, a theorist should appeal to the same methodological guideline to evaluate each 
rival legal theory concerning an issue in order to determine which legal theory is (the most) 
accurate and adequate. A theorist should apply the same methodological guideline to 
examine each rival legal theory concerning an issue to accomplish a consistent analysis that 
provides coherent and cogent determination.   
For example, suppose β (a theorist) evaluates two theorists’ rival propositions about 
the law concerning an issue φ—say P1 and P2—in comparison with each other. Further, 
suppose β concludes P1 is (the most) accurate and adequate account of φ because (a) P1 
satisfies criterion-x and (b) P2 fails criterion-y. β’s conclusion is suspicious because the 
reasons for his support of P1 and criticism of P2 are inconsistent. β appeals to a different 
methodological guideline to evaluate each rival proposition about φ. Hence, it is possible 
that (c) P2 satisfies criterion-x and (d) P1 fails criterion-y. If (a), (b), (c), and (d) are true, β’s 
conclusion is false: P1 and P2 are equally accurate and adequate in terms of β’s two 
imported methodological guidelines. Thus, β’s conclusion is weak with (c) and (d) as open 
possibilities. For a coherent and cogent conclusion, β should show that (1) P1 satisfies 
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criterion-x and criterion-y and that (2) P2 fails the same criteria. β, that is, should appeal to 
the same methodological guidelines to evaluate each rival proposition about φ.  
B.    What Is Necessary to Achieve the Primary Goal 
Unsurprisingly, as a result of the methodology conflict, theorists differ as to what 
methodology they think theorists should import into their comparative and non-comparative 
examinations.113  F2 of the methodology conflict (that is, theorists’ commitment to either 
imperialism or relativism in response different methodologies) creates opposing views about 
which methodology theorists should import into their examinations. An imperialist believes 
theorists should import the methodology that he (the imperialist) endorses. A relativist 
believes theorists should import the methodology that the theorist (who generated the legal 
theory under examination) endorses. For example, Dworkin (an imperialist) believes all 
legal theories should satisfy the methodology that he endorses, whereas Hart (a relativist) 
believes only Dworkin’s legal theory must satisfy the methodology that Dworkin endorses. 
Thus, theorists in jurisprudence today appeal to numerous different methodologies when 
evaluating to what extent legal theories are accurate and adequate (comparatively or non-
comparatively).   
To show that theorists appeal to different methodologies to evaluate the accuracy 
and adequacy of legal theories is not enough to demonstrate that the methodology conflict 
constitutes a problem for their examinations. Today, many theorists can and do evaluate the 
accuracy and adequacy of legal theories appealing to different methodologies. They are able 
to achieve the independent goal of their respective examinations: that is, determine to what 
                                                 
 113 I realize this point may seem obvious or redundant to some readers, but I will explain it 
below to be sure. 
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extent a legal theory is accurate and adequate (comparatively or non-comparatively). This 
fact is unobjectionable. However, the collective goal of theorists’ examinations cannot avoid 
the methodology conflict so easily. For the remainder of this section, I defend the claim that 
theorists cannot achieve agreement about which legal theory is (the most) accurate and 
adequate unless they reach agreement about which methodology a legal theory should 
satisfy to be accurate and adequate in advance. To be clear, I believe the latter agreement is 
a precondition for the former agreement.   
However, theorists that accept pragmatism (who I call pragmatists) in response to 
the methodology conflict appear to reject this claim. Pragmatists operate as if agreement 
about which methodology a legal theory should satisfy is not a necessary condition to be 
able to achieve the collective goal. For pragmatists, agreement about which legal theory is 
(the most) accurate and adequate is sufficient to accomplish the collective goal. Theorists 
can import different methodologies into their examinations, without sacrificing their ability 
to achieve the collective goal. To achieve agreement about which legal theory is (the most) 
accurate and adequate under pragmatism, theorists must find a legal theory that satisfies the 
different methodologies that they import into their examinations. For example, if T1 (a legal 
theory) satisfies each methodology that imperialists and relativists import into their 
examinations, pragmatists would consider such overlapping results to constitute agreement 
that T1 is (the most) accurate and adequate (that is, a common answer to the question “what 
is law?”). If pragmatists are correct that agreement about which methodology a legal theory 
should satisfy is not a necessary condition to be able to achieve agreement about which legal 
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theory is (the most) accurate and adequate, then the methodology conflict cannot prevent 
theorists from achieving the collective goal as I claimed.   
While I acknowledge that theorists importing different methodologies into their 
examinations could reach overlapping conclusions that a legal theory is (the most) accurate 
and adequate, pragmatists should not equate it with agreement that the legal theory is (the 
most) accurate and adequate. Theorists’ overlapping determinations that a legal theory is 
(the most) accurate and adequate are insufficient to achieve the collective goal because 
theorists will disagree about why the legal theory is (the most) accurate and adequate if they 
import different methodologies into their examinations. For example, suppose Hart, Finnis, 
Dworkin, and Leiter each conclude that T1 (a legal theory) is (the most) accurate and 
adequate. For pragmatists, agreement that T1 is (the most) accurate and adequate now exists 
because T1 satisfies the imported methodology that each theorist thinks a legal theory should 
satisfy. However, since Hart, Finnis, Dworkin, and Leiter disagree about which 
methodology a legal theory should satisfy, they will disagree about why T1 is (the most) 
accurate and adequate. For imperialists and relativists, a theorist can provide the correct 
reasons to support or criticize the accuracy and adequacy of a legal theory only by appealing 
to the proper methodology. Hart, Finnis, Dworkin, and Leiter will disagree with the reasons 
that each other provided to determine T1 is (the most) accurate and adequate because each 
believes the others did not appeal to the proper methodology. Thus, as long as theorists 
continue to import different methodologies into their examinations, disagreement about 
which reasons why a legal theory is (the most) accurate and adequate are correct will 
underlie overlapping results that a legal theory is (the most) accurate and adequate.   
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Perhaps I misunderstand how pragmatism responds to the methodology conflict. For 
pragmatists, part of the response to the methodology conflict probably entails dropping the 
notion of a single proper methodology that each legal theory must, which is the crux of the 
disagreement between imperialists and relativists. Instead, pragmatists require each legal 
theory to satisfy all (or the majority of) the imported methodologies to be (the most) 
accurate and adequate. Each methodology has equal importance. Thus, pragmatists work 
toward a common answer to the question “what is law?” by appealing to all methodologies, 
rather than one proper methodology, to determine which legal theory is (the most) accurate 
and adequate. To be fair, without the notion of a single proper methodology to import into 
their examinations, pragmatists can avoid any sense in which some reasons why a legal 
theory is (the most) accurate and adequate are better or worse than other reasons. All 
reasons have equal importance. For pragmatists, then, the more reasons to support the 
accuracy and adequacy of a legal theory the more accurate and adequate the legal theory is.   
Nevertheless, I believe different reasons why a legal theory is (the most) accurate 
and adequate amount to different, and sometimes opposing, understandings of what a legal 
theory explains about the law accurately and adequately. For example, suppose Hart and 
Finnis each conclude that Raz’s legal theory is (the most) accurate and adequate. To 
evaluate whether Raz’s legal theory is (the most) accurate and adequate, Hart (a relativist) 
imported Raz’s methodology into his examination, which Finnis (an imperialist) imported 
his methodology into his examination. Each theorist understands Raz’s legal theory in terms 
of the imported methodology that Raz satisfies. Finnis believes Raz to provide a successful 
evaluative theory of law, whereas Hart believes Raz to provide a successful descriptive 
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theory of law. Their overlapping conclusions that Raz’s legal theory is (the most) accurate 
and adequate entail conflicting understandings of what Raz explains about the law 
accurately and adequately: Finnis praises Raz for making the correct moral judgments about 
the law, and Hart praises Raz for making no moral judgments about the law. Surely, if 
theorists differ about what a legal theory explains about the law accurately and adequately, 
then their overlapping conclusions that the legal theory is (the most) accurate and adequate 
are insufficient means to achieve the collective goal (that is, to constitute a common answer 
to the question “what is law?”).   
To conclude, I state the necessary conditions that theorists must fulfill to engage in 
meaningful debate about which legal theory is (the most) accurate and adequate and achieve 
the collective goal. I illustrated above that theorists must agree about (A1) which legal 
theory is (the most) accurate and adequate and (A2) why the legal theory is (the most) 
accurate and adequate. If theorists disagree about A1or A2, they will fail to achieve the 
collective goal. I contend that theorists can achieve agreement about A1 and A2 by fulfilling 
the following two necessary conditions.   
The first condition (C1) is agreement about which methodology (or methodologies) 
theorists should import into their comparative and non-comparative examinations to 
evaluate the accuracy and adequacy of legal theories. C1 is necessary to make agreement 
about A2 possible and agreement about A1 more likely. Unless theorists agree about which 
methodology each legal theory must satisfy, they cannot agree about the reasons why a legal 
theory is (the most) accurate and adequate. With agreement about which methodology 
theorists should import into their examinations, theorists will engage in meaningful debate 
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about which legal theory is (the most) accurate and adequate and work more successfully 
towards achieving the collective goal. To put more simply, by fulfilling C1, theorists will no 
longer talk past each other. The second condition (C2) is agreement about which legal 
theory is (the most) accurate and adequate according to the methodology (or each 
methodology) that theorists agreed to import into their comparative and non-comparative 
examinations. In addition to C1, C2 is necessary to achieve agreement about A1 and A2 in 
fact. Even if theorists fulfill C1, they can fail to achieve the collective goal. Theorists could 
disagree about whether (and to what extent) a legal theory satisfies the entire set of 
methodological guidelines that they agreed to import into their examination, which would 
entail some sort of disagreement about either A1 or A2.   
Today, C1 remains unfulfilled in jurisprudence because theorists disagree about S2. 
Without agreement about which methodology each legal theory should satisfy, the current 
debate about A1 seem meaningless because theorists cannot agree about A2. That is not to 
suggest that current conversations possess no value. Nevertheless, if theorists ever want to 
end the long and continuing history of diverse, strange, and paradoxical answers to the 
question “what is law?” with a common answer, they should take the problem that the 
methodology conflict constitutes for the collective goal of their examinations seriously. The 
methodology conflict prevents theorists from achieving the collective goal and, thereby, the 
primary goal of jurisprudence. Thus, I believe that theorists must resolve the methodology 
conflict first. 
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V.    CONCLUSION: HOW TO RESOLVE THE METHODOLOGY CONFLICT  
Heretofore, I explained how and why Hart, Raz, Finnis, Dworkin, Leiter, and other 
theorists talk past each other in the debate about S1 without an agreement about S2. I argued 
that theorists cannot agree about (A1) which legal theory is (the most) accurate and 
adequate and (A2) why the legal theory is (the most) accurate and adequate until they 
resolve their disagreement about S2. In this section, I consider how theorists should resolve 
the methodology conflict. Today, theorists that work to reach agreement about S2 as their 
primary or secondary concern usually attempt to resolve the methodology conflict with two 
familiar approaches: namely, either imperialism or relativism. I argue that a synthesis of 
these two approaches—one that combines their strengths and eliminates their weaknesses—
provides a solution to the methodology conflict that will allow theorists to achieve the 
primary goal of jurisprudence. In Section V.A, I identify some central strengths and 
weaknesses of imperialism and relativism. In Section V.B, I offer a reasonable four-step 
examination process that allows theorists to engage in meaningful debate about S1 and S2 
and work more successfully towards achieving the collective goal of their examinations. 
A.    Comments on the Two Current Approaches 
For some theorists, imperialism is the proper approach to resolve the methodology 
conflict. Theorists work to reach agreement about which methodology all legal theories 
should satisfy to be (the most) accurate and adequate. The proper methodology designates 
what is important and necessary to explain about the law in order to further our 
understanding of what the law is. For imperialists, theorists should import the proper 
methodology into their examinations to determine which single legal theory is (the most) 
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accurate and adequate. If a theorist imports a different methodology into his examinations, 
he will in some way fail to test legal theories for what is important and necessary to explain 
about the law. Since several imperialists already disagree about which methodology is the 
proper methodology for jurisprudence, achieving such agreement among theorists is a 
difficult task to complete today. 
Nevertheless, despite the difficult task imperialism poses, I suspect that theorists 
accept imperialism to resolve the methodology conflict because they believe jurisprudence 
should deliver a particular outcome: namely, a single “correct,” “true,” or “fruitful” legal 
theory that furthers our understanding of what the law is. Imperialists probably want this 
outcome from jurisprudence due to the basic intuition that a single accurate and adequate 
explanation exists for each phenomenon or set of phenomena, such as the law. For 
imperialists, the collective goal is to achieve agreement about which one legal theory is (the 
most) accurate and adequate according to the proper methodology that theorists should 
import into their examinations. Because theorists appeal to the same methodology to 
evaluate all legal theories under imperialism, they are more likely to achieve agreement 
about which one legal theory is (the most) accurate and adequate in the sense that a single 
“correct,” “true,” or “fruitful” explanation exists for the law.114 I acknowledge that requiring 
theorists to satisfy a common methodology to produce a single accurate and adequate theory 
of law can be a reasonable prospective approach to achieve a common answer to the 
question “what is law?”. 
                                                 
 114 Cf. Bix, Jurisprudence, 28. 
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However, to require that existing legal theories satisfy a common methodology—a 
methodology the theorists (who generated the legal theories under examination) likely do 
not endorse—is an unfair retrospective approach to achieve the collective goal. For 
example, Dworkin (an imperialist) imports one of his checking-points (which I explained in 
Section II.B) to serve as one proper methodological guideline to evaluate the accuracy and 
adequacy of all legal theories.115 Dworkin’s checking-point requires all theorists to account 
for the theoretical disagreements about law that judges and lawyers actually do have. 
Dworkin shows that legal positivist theories, which, for Dworkin, includes legal theories 
authored by Hart and Raz, cannot and do not explain the theoretical disagreements about 
law that judges and lawyers actually do have. Dworkin concludes that Hart and Raz fail his 
methodological guideline and thus provide inaccurate and inadequate accounts of the law to 
some extent. Hart and Raz do not commit to satisfy the checking-point Dworkin endorses. 
Dworkin (as an imperialist) believes all theorists should explain this particular fact or data 
about legal phenomena to provide an accurate and adequate account of the law, regardless 
of whether Hart, Raz, or other theorists in fact endorse the same methodological guideline. I 
believe Dworkin’s conclusion that Hart’s and Raz’s legal theories is unfair because 
Dworkin held Hart and Raz accountable to a methodological guideline that they do not 
commit to satisfy.116 
                                                 
 115 See Dworkin, Law’s Empire, 3-47.  
 116 I admit that appealing to a methodological guideline that a theorist does not commit to 
satisfy can be appropriate or even necessary in certain circumstances. However, before appealing to 
a methodological guideline that a theorist does not commit to satisfy, I will contend below that 
requiring the theorist (who constructed the legal theory under examination) to satisfy the 
methodology he endorses first is a more fair approach to determine to what extent his legal theory is 
accurate and adequate (comparatively or non-comparatively). 
 51
Moreover, in spite of its weaknesses, imperialism possesses a significant strength: 
namely, imperialists usually question whether a methodology can be satisfied in the sense 
that it is theoretically possible for a theorist to provide a legal theory that satisfies the 
methodology he endorses successfully. For example, Finnis and Dworkin—albeit for 
different reasons—deny that Hart and Raz can provide a legal theory that satisfies their 
methodological commitment to a purely descriptive analysis-method. Finnis and Dworkin 
believe that Hart and Raz fails and will always fail provide a legal theory that satisfies this 
methodological guideline. Hart and Raz’s methodological commitment to a morally neutral 
analysis of the law entails believing that generating a set of propositions does not 
necessarily require moral evaluation or justification of the law. However, Finnis and 
Dworkin believe that generating a set of propositions about the law necessarily requires 
moral evaluation or justification of the law.117  If Finnis and Dworkin are correct that it is 
theoretically impossible for Hart and Raz to provide a legal theory that satisfies this 
methodological guideline successfully, their legal theories could not explain what the law is 
accurately and adequately in the manner that Hart and Raz claim. For that reason, I believe 
this form of questioning should be a legitimate and an important part of theorists’ efforts to 
determine to what extent a legal theory is accurate and adequate (comparatively or non-
comparatively). Theorists have no reason to trust that theorists can satisfy the methodology 
that each endorses.   
                                                 
 117 To a large extent, this dispute about whether an analysis of the law necessarily involves 
moral evaluation or justification between Hart and Raz versus Finnis and Dworkin rests on other 
methodological guidelines—namely, their respective starting-points and participant-perspectives—
that those theorists believe should be satisfied to provide a legal theory that is an accurate and 
adequate account of the law. For further explanation, see Dickson, Evaluation and Legal Theory, 7-
9. 
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In contrast to imperialism, some theorists believe relativism is the proper approach 
to resolve the methodology conflict. Theorists work to reach agreement about which 
methodology each legal theory should satisfy to be (the most) accurate and adequate as well 
as how different methodologies are compatible or continuous with each other. Theorists 
should import the methodology that the theorist (who generated the legal theory under 
examination) endorses into their examinations to determine to what extent a legal theory is 
accurate and adequate (comparatively or non-comparatively). For relativists, each theorist is 
accountable to the methodological guidelines that he commits to satisfy. Unfortunately, 
relativists usually blindly accept that each methodology can be satisfied successfully, which 
is mistake for the reasons I expressed above. Nonetheless, I believe that requiring each 
theorist to satisfy the methodology he endorses is a fair retrospective and prospective 
approach to evaluate legal theories and achieve the collective goal. 
I suspect that theorists accept relativism to resolve the methodology conflict because 
they believe jurisprudence should deliver the broadest possible understanding of what the 
law is. Relativists want to study and explain the law in as many diverse ways as possible to 
broaden our understanding of what the law is. The broad and diverse understanding of law 
that relativism offers is more appealing than the narrow and singular understanding of law 
that imperialism offers. Unlike other phenomena (such as gravity or the creation of the 
universe), the law is a social set of phenomena that involves historical, anthropological, 
moral, political, and economic questions in addition to legal issues. To answer all these 
questions accurately and adequately in a single legal theory according to a single 
methodology seems unlikely, which I think make relativism the more reasonable approach. 
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For relativists, the collective goal is to achieve agreement about which legal theories 
are (the most) accurate and adequate according to their relative methodologies that theorists 
should import into their examinations. Because theorists appeal to different methodologies 
to evaluate different legal theories under relativism, they cannot achieve agreement about 
which one legal theory is (the most) accurate and adequate in the sense that a single 
“correct,” “true,” or “fruitful” explanation exists for the law. To imperialists, this is a 
significant flaw because relativism appears to be unable to achieve a common answer to the 
question “what is law?” However, I believe theorists can achieve the primary goal under 
relativism. Theorists are able to affirm or deny whether a legal theory is accurate and 
adequate, or more accurate and adequate than another legal theory, relative to a particular 
methodology.118  Agreement about which legal theories are (the most) accurate and 
adequate according to their relative methodologies—as long as those legal theories are 
compatible or continuous with each other—is sufficient to constitute a common answer to 
the question “what is law?”.   
Furthermore, under relativism, the amount of theorists that endorse a methodology 
determines whether commentators should use comparative or non-comparative examination 
to evaluate the accuracy and adequacy of legal theories most effectively. If one theorist 
endorses M3 (a methodology), commentators should use a non-comparative examination to 
evaluate whether his legal theory is accurate and adequate according to M3. However, if 
multiple theorists endorse M3, and if each theorist generated an individual theory of law, 
                                                 
 118 Cf. Bix, Jurisprudence, 28. 
 54
commentators should use a comparative examination to evaluate which legal theory is (the 
most) accurate and adequate according to M3. 
However, relativism offers no explicit standard of acceptable methodological 
difference to determine the proper form of examination. For example, due to the numerous 
methodological differences between Dworkin and himself, Hart (a relativist)  believes that 
Dworkin and his legal theories do not require comparative examination to determine which 
legal theory is (the most) account and adequate. In contrast to Dworkin, Hart appears to 
believe that Raz’s and his legal theories do require comparative examination. Yet, Hart and 
Raz have a subtle methodological difference concerning their starting-points: Hart believes 
that the various rules of a legal system should be explanatory primary, whereas Raz believes 
that the various reasons for actions that the various norms of a legal system provide should 
be explanatory primary. Hart was probably aware of this methodological difference, but 
apparently it was not enough for Hart to understand Raz as offering a differing rather than 
competing legal theory. For theorists to work successfully towards achieving the collective 
goal under relativism, a standard that specifies to what extent at least two theorists can 
endorse different methodological guidelines and yet still require comparative examination 
(rather than non-comparative examination) to evaluate which legal theory is (the most) 
accurate and adequate. I believe that requiring a comparative examination if at least two 
theorists endorse identical sets of methodological guidelines is the standard of acceptable 
methodological difference that is most consistent with relativism.   
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B.    A New Approach 
 In conclusion, I will offer a new approach that allows theorists to engage in 
meaningful debate about S1 and S2 and work more successfully towards achieving the 
collective goal. Previously, I explained in Section IV.B that theorists must fulfill C1, which, 
in effect, resolves the methodology conflict, if theorists are to be able to agree about (A1) 
which legal theory is (the most) accurate and adequate and (A2) why the legal theory is (the 
most) accurate and adequate. Then, I explained above the strengths and weaknesses of the 
two current approaches to resolve the methodology conflict. The most pressing question 
now is the following: how should theorists fulfill C1?   
I answer in the spirit of relativism. I believe that theorists should import the 
methodology that the theorist (who generated the legal theory under examination) endorses 
into their comparative and non-comparative examinations. However, fulfilling C1 by 
accepting relativism in its current form does not ensure that theorists can and will agree 
about A1 and A2 because relativism has weaknesses that affect theorists’ ability to agree 
about A1 and A2: namely, it does not (a) require identical methodologies for comparative 
examinations and (b) question whether methodologies can be satisfied. To be sure, the latter 
is a procedure that imperialism accomplishes extremely well. The approach that I offer must 
do both. In addition, relativism requires that theorists compare successful legal theories to 
determine whether they contradict each other. The acceptance of legal theories contradict 
each other—despite their successfulness—would result in a contradictory understanding of 
the law, which is unacceptable.   
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 Accordingly, I offer a new retrospective and prospective four-step examination 
process that provides a strategy for how theorists should resolve the methodology conflict 
and proceed towards the primary goal of jurisprudence. The first step is to determine 
whether any other theorists commit to satisfy the identical methodology that the theorist 
(whose legal theory is the primary object under examination) endorses. The second step is to 
determine whether the methodology the theorist (whose legal theory is the primary object 
under examination) commits to satisfy can be satisfied. The third step is to determine to 
what extent a legal theory is (the most) accurate and adequate according to the methodology 
that the theorist (who generated legal theory under examination) endorses (comparatively or 
non-comparatively). The fourth step is to determine whether any legal theories considered to 
be (the most) accurate and adequate according to their respective methodologies are 
compatible or continuous with each other or contradict with each other. 
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